fix bug for withdrawal.

packages/contracts-bedrock/scripts/getting-started/config.sh

@@ -153,8 +153,8 @@ cat << EOL >> tmp_config.json
   "daResolveWindow": 100,
   "daBondSize": 1000,
   "daResolverRefundPercentage": 50,
-  "useCustomGasToken": false,
-  "customGasTokenAddress": "0x88395111AB1586a4030dAC62a183542762929bbC"
+  "useCustomGasToken": true,
+  "customGasTokenAddress": "0x9c4bd341cf7134a53b1f34cfa9f3dea4fde61c9c"
 }
 EOL
 

packages/contracts-bedrock/src/L1/OptimismPortal.sol

@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
     }
 
     /// @notice Returns the gas paying token and its decimals.
-    function gasPayingToken() internal view returns (address addr_, uint8 decimals_) {
+    function gasPayingToken() public view returns (address addr_, uint8 decimals_) {
         (addr_, decimals_) = systemConfig.gasPayingToken();
     }
 
@@ -430,7 +430,6 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
 //            revert GasEstimation();
 //        }
     }
-    event Println(uint256 line);
 
 
     /// @notice withdrawal for a user.
@@ -447,20 +446,10 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
     external
     whenNotPaused
     {
-        emit Println(1);
-        if (_param.user == address(this)) revert BadTarget();
-        emit Println(2);
-        bytes32 outputRoot = l2Oracle.getL2Output(_l2OutputIndex).outputRoot;
-        emit Println(3);
+        require(_param.user!=address(this), "BadTarget()");
+        Types.OutputProposal memory proposal = l2Oracle.getL2Output(_l2OutputIndex);
+        bytes32 outputRoot = proposal.outputRoot;
         bytes32 withdrawalHash = Hashing.hashExChainWithdrawal(_param);
-        emit Println(4);
-        ProvenWithdrawal memory provenWithdrawal = provenWithdrawals[withdrawalHash];
-        require(
-            provenWithdrawal.timestamp == 0
-            || l2Oracle.getL2Output(provenWithdrawal.l2OutputIndex).outputRoot != provenWithdrawal.outputRoot,
-            "OptimismPortal: withdrawal hash has already been proven"
-        );
-        emit Println(5);
 
         // Verify that the hash of this withdrawal was stored in the L2toL1MessagePasser contract
         // on L2. If this is true, under the assumption that the SecureMerkleTrie does not have
@@ -475,7 +464,6 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
             }),
             "OptimismPortal: invalid withdrawal inclusion proof"
         );
-        emit Println(6);
 
         // Designate the withdrawalHash as proven by storing the `outputRoot`, `timestamp`, and
         // `l2BlockNumber` in the `provenWithdrawals` mapping. A `withdrawalHash` can only be
@@ -485,30 +473,24 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
             timestamp: uint128(block.timestamp),
             l2OutputIndex: uint128(_l2OutputIndex)
         });
-        emit Println(7);
         // Check that this withdrawal has not already been finalized, this is replay protection.
         require(finalizedWithdrawals[withdrawalHash] == false, "OptimismPortal: withdrawal has already been finalized");
-        emit Println(8);
 
         // Mark the withdrawal as finalized so it can't be replayed.
         finalizedWithdrawals[withdrawalHash] = true;
-        emit Println(9);
 
         // Set the l2Sender so contracts know who triggered this withdrawal on L2.
         // This acts as a reentrancy guard.
         l2Sender = msg.sender;
 
         bool success;
-        emit Println(10);
         (address token,) = gasPayingToken();
         if (token == Constants.ETHER) {
-            emit Println(11);
             success = SafeCall.send(_param.user, _param.value);
         } else {
             // Cannot call the token contract directly from the portal. This would allow an attacker
             // to call approve from a withdrawal and drain the balance of the portal.
-            emit Println(12);
-            if (_param.user == token) revert BadTarget();
+            require(_param.user != token, "BadTarget() user queal token address");
 
             // Only transfer value when a non zero value is specified. This saves gas in the case of
             // using the standard bridge or arbitrary message passing.

proposer.sh

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 source .envrc
 
 ./bin/op-proposer \
-  --data-dir=./data/proposer \
+  --data-dir=./node/proposer \
   --poll-interval=12s \
   --rpc.port=8560 \
   --rollup-rpc=http://127.0.0.1:9545 \
   --l2oo-address=$(cat ./deployer/artifact.json  | grep "L2OutputOracleProxy" | grep -Eo "0x[a-fA-F0-9]+") \
-  --portal-address=$(cat ./deployer/artifact.json  | grep -w "OptimismPortal" | grep -Eo "0x[a-fA-F0-9]+") \
+  --portal-address=$(cat ./deployer/artifact.json  | grep -w "OptimismPortalProxy" | grep -Eo "0x[a-fA-F0-9]+") \
   --private-key=$GS_PROPOSER_PRIVATE_KEY \
   --l1-eth-rpc=$L1_RPC_URL