update contract for withdrawal

layer2/contracts-bedrock/src/L1/OptimismPortal.sol

@@ -430,7 +430,6 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
 //            revert GasEstimation();
 //        }
     }
-    event Println(uint256 line);
 
 
     /// @notice withdrawal for a user.
@@ -447,20 +446,10 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
     external
     whenNotPaused
     {
-        emit Println(1);
-        if (_param.user == address(this)) revert BadTarget();
-        emit Println(2);
-        bytes32 outputRoot = l2Oracle.getL2Output(_l2OutputIndex).outputRoot;
-        emit Println(3);
+        require(_param.user!=address(this), "BadTarget()");
+        Types.OutputProposal memory proposal = l2Oracle.getL2Output(_l2OutputIndex);
+        bytes32 outputRoot = proposal.outputRoot;
         bytes32 withdrawalHash = Hashing.hashExChainWithdrawal(_param);
-        emit Println(4);
-        ProvenWithdrawal memory provenWithdrawal = provenWithdrawals[withdrawalHash];
-        require(
-            provenWithdrawal.timestamp == 0
-            || l2Oracle.getL2Output(provenWithdrawal.l2OutputIndex).outputRoot != provenWithdrawal.outputRoot,
-            "OptimismPortal: withdrawal hash has already been proven"
-        );
-        emit Println(5);
 
         // Verify that the hash of this withdrawal was stored in the L2toL1MessagePasser contract
         // on L2. If this is true, under the assumption that the SecureMerkleTrie does not have
@@ -475,7 +464,6 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
             }),
             "OptimismPortal: invalid withdrawal inclusion proof"
         );
-        emit Println(6);
 
         // Designate the withdrawalHash as proven by storing the `outputRoot`, `timestamp`, and
         // `l2BlockNumber` in the `provenWithdrawals` mapping. A `withdrawalHash` can only be
@@ -485,30 +473,24 @@ contract OptimismPortal is Initializable, ResourceMetering, ISemver {
             timestamp: uint128(block.timestamp),
             l2OutputIndex: uint128(_l2OutputIndex)
         });
-        emit Println(7);
         // Check that this withdrawal has not already been finalized, this is replay protection.
         require(finalizedWithdrawals[withdrawalHash] == false, "OptimismPortal: withdrawal has already been finalized");
-        emit Println(8);
 
         // Mark the withdrawal as finalized so it can't be replayed.
         finalizedWithdrawals[withdrawalHash] = true;
-        emit Println(9);
 
         // Set the l2Sender so contracts know who triggered this withdrawal on L2.
         // This acts as a reentrancy guard.
         l2Sender = msg.sender;
 
         bool success;
-        emit Println(10);
         (address token,) = gasPayingToken();
         if (token == Constants.ETHER) {
-            emit Println(11);
             success = SafeCall.send(_param.user, _param.value);
         } else {
             // Cannot call the token contract directly from the portal. This would allow an attacker
             // to call approve from a withdrawal and drain the balance of the portal.
-            emit Println(12);
-            if (_param.user == token) revert BadTarget();
+            require(_param.user != token, "BadTarget() user queal token address");
 
             // Only transfer value when a non zero value is specified. This saves gas in the case of
             // using the standard bridge or arbitrary message passing.