Commit 330728ca authored by mergify[bot]'s avatar mergify[bot] Committed by GitHub

Merge pull request #5284 from ethereum-optimism/refcell/proposer

specs: Permissionless Proposer Specifications
parents dccebbb9 b942a736
......@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@
<!-- END doctoc generated TOC please keep comment here to allow auto update -->
After processing one or more blocks the outputs will need to be synchronized with L1 for trustless execution of
L2-to-L1 messaging, such as withdrawals.
The output proposals act as the bridge's view into the L2 state.
Proposers submit the output roots to L1 and can be contested with a fault proof,
with a bond at stake if the proof is wrong.
After processing one or more blocks the outputs will need to be synchronized with the settlement layer (L1)
for trustless execution of L2-to-L1 messaging, such as withdrawals.
These output proposals act as the bridge's view into the L2 state.
Actors called "Proposers" submit the output roots to the settlement layer (L1) and can be contested with a fault proof,
with a bond at stake if the proof is wrong. The [op-proposer](../op-proposer/) in one such implementation of a proposer.
_Note_: Fault proofs on Optimism are not fully specified at this time. Although fault proof
construction and verification [is implemented in Cannon][cannon],
......@@ -38,15 +38,10 @@ are part of later specification milestones.
## Proposing L2 Output Commitments
The proposer's role is to construct and submit output roots, which are commitments to the L2's state,
to the `L2OutputOracle` contract on L1 (the settlement layer). It does this by running the
[L2 output proposer](../op-proposer/), a service which periodically queries the rollup node's
[`optimism_outputAtBlock` rpc method](./rollup-node.md#l2-output-rpc-method) for the latest output root derived
from the latest [finalized](rollup-node.md#finalization-guarantees) L1 block. The construction of this output root is
described [below](#l2-output-commitment-construction).
An implementation may submit output commitments that correspond to unsafe (non-finalized) L2 blocks
but this comes with risk as it will be possible to submit L2 blocks that do not correspond to the
output commitments that have already been made available.
to the `L2OutputOracle` contract on L1 (the settlement layer). To do this, the proposer periodically
queries the [rollup node](./rollup-node.md) for the latest output root derived from the latest
[finalized](rollup-node.md#finalization-guarantees) L1 block. It then takes the output root and
submits it to the `L2OutputOracle` contract on the settlement layer (L1).
### L2OutputOracle v1.0.0
......@@ -75,8 +70,8 @@ while True:
time.sleep(poll_interval)
```
A `CHALLENGER` account can delete multiple output roots by calling the `deleteL2Outputs()` function and specifying the
index of the first output to delete, this will also delete all subsequent outputs.
A `CHALLENGER` account can delete multiple output roots by calling the `deleteL2Outputs()` function
and specifying the index of the first output to delete, this will also delete all subsequent outputs.
### L2OutputOracle v2.0.0
......@@ -88,10 +83,42 @@ either via fault proof or by an attestation proof, then the bond can be slashed
payment to the users who paid for gas to remove the malicious output.
The `op-proposer` can still be used to submit output proposals. A naive implementation of the
`op-proposer` will still submit output proposals on an interval. A more ideal implementation
`op-proposer` will submit output proposals on an interval. However, this is not required, and other
proposer implementations may submit valid outputs at any time. A more ideal implementation
will use heuristics such as time of last submission or number of pending withdrawals that have
yet to be included in an output proposal.
A single iteration of this proposer (posting one output root to L1) is depicted below:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant L1
participant Rollup Node
participant Proposer
L1->>L1: L1 block finalized
L1->>Rollup Node: L1 block finalized
Proposer->>Rollup Node: optimism_syncStatus
Rollup Node->>Proposer: sync status { finalized L1 block num }
Proposer->>Rollup Node: optimism_outputAtBlock
Rollup Node->>Proposer: output root
Proposer->>L1: Query L2OutputOracle for this output root
L1->>Proposer: output root or nil
Proposer->>Proposer: stop if the current output is already proposed
Proposer->>L1: L2OutputOracle.proposeOutputRoot
```
Since there may be multiple proposers running simultaneously when permissionless output proposals are enabled,
the [op-proposer](../op-proposer/) will check that it's output root has not been posted for the given L2 block
number before sending the proposal transaction. This is shown in the sequence diagram above when the `Proposer`
queries the `L2OutputOracle` for the output root. If it receives an output root that is equal to the one it
received from the rollup node, it will **not** send this output root in a transaction to the `L2OutputOracle`.
Also note, while the [op-proposer](../op-proposer/) implementation submits outputs _only_ based on finalized
or safe L2 blocks, other proposer implementations may submit outputs corresponding to unsafe (non-finalized)
L2 blocks. This comes with risk as it will be possible for [batchers](./batcher.md) to submit L2 blocks that
do not correspond to the output that have already been made available (implying those outputs are now _invalid_).
Version `v2.0.0` includes breaking changes to the `L2OutputOracle` ABI.
## L2 Output Commitment Construction
......
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